EXHIBIT

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TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on October 6, 2009, the Court entered the attached Ruling on Motion for Summary Adjudication denying defendant Shell Oil Company's Motion for Summary Adjudication on the First Through Eighth Causes of Action and Joinder by Occidental Chemical Corporation and Occidental Petroleum Corporation heard before Judge Alvarez, San Bernardino Superior Court, Department S-33 on August 7, 2009.

DATED: October 26, 2009

MILLER, AXLINE & SAWYER

A Professional Corporation

By:

TRACEY L. O'REILLY Attorneys for plaintiff

Superior Court of California 1 County of San Bernardino Civil Division, Department S-33 2 FILED-Central District 303 West Third Street SUPERIOR COURT SAN BERNARDING COUNTY San Bernardino, California 92415 3 OCT - 8 2009 4 By Stephenie Chandle 5 6 7 8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 10 SAN BERNARDINO DISTRICT 11 12 CITY OF REDLANDS Case No.: SCVSS 120627 JCPSS 4435 13 Plaintiff, RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 14 ADJUDICATION (SHELL OIL COMPANY MOTION OF AUGUST 7, 2009 - WITH VS. 15 JOINDER BY OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL SHELL OIL COMPANY CORPORATION, ET AL. 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 20 This matter came before the court for a hearing on a motion for summary 21 adjudication as to the second amended complaint by moving Defendants. 22 The court has reviewed and considered the extensive briefs by and between the 23 parties as well as the oral arguments of counsel and issues its ruling as follows. 24 A. Background 25 The City's second amended complaint alleges eight causes of action: (1) strict 26 liability regarding TCP; (2) negligence regarding TCP; (3) continuing nuisance regarding 27 TCP; (4) continuing trespass regarding TCP; (5) strict liability regarding DBCP; 28

¹ "MCL" means Maximum Contaminant Level,

(6) negligence regarding DBCP; (7) continuing nuisance regarding DBCP; and

(8) continuing trespass regarding DBCP.

In this motion for summary adjudication against all eight causes of action of plaintiffs' complaint, defendant shell challenges but one element that is common to each of these causes of action: damages.

Specifically, with regard to the first four causes of action based on TCP contamination, Shell argues that the City can show no damages because it cannot show that Shell contaminated its wells such that the water in its wells contained TCP above the California Department of Public Health "MCL" levels¹ . . . simply because the DPH has not yet set any MCL levels for TCP. Additionally, Shell argues that two of the wells are not currently used to supply potable drinking water.

With regard to the last four cause of action based on DBCP contamination, Shell argues that levels exceed the DPH's MCL level for DBCP in only two the City's wells, and those two are not currently being used by the City as a source of potable drinking water.

B. Preliminary Considerations

Very recent California appellate authority from our own Fourth District,

Division Two, has approved the procedure of limiting the consideration of evidence presented at summary judgment to that evidence "called to the trial court's attention in the separate statement of one side or the other." Specifically, our court of appeal stated:

Because this is an appeal from a summary judgment, we draw the following facts from the moving and opposition papers in connection with defendants' motion for summary judgment. We accept all facts listed in defendants' [i.e., the moving parties'] separate statement that plaintiffs [i.e., the responding parties] did not dispute. We also accept all facts listed in defendants' separate statement that plaintiffs did dispute, to the extent that (1) there is evidence to support them (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1)), and (2) there is no evidence to support the dispute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3)). Finally, we accept all facts listed in plaintiffs' separate statement, to the extent

that there is evidence to support them. (*Ibid.*) We disregard any evidence not called to the trial court's attention in the separate statement of one side or the other, except as necessary to provide nondispositive background, color, or continuity. (See San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 314–316....)

(Doe v. California Lutheran High School Assn. (4th Dist., Div. 2, 2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 828, 830-831, rev. den., req. for depub. den.) (Opinion by Richli; Ramirez and Miller concurring. Boldface emphasis added.)

Accordingly, the trial court summary judgment procedure approved by our Fourth District, Division Two, in *Doe*, *supra*, is as follows:

- [1] Accept all facts listed in the moving party's separate statement that the responding party did not dispute.
- [2] Accept all facts listed in the moving party's separate statement that the responding party *did* dispute, to the extent that (1) there is evidence to support them (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1)), <u>and</u> (2) there is no evidence to support the dispute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3)).
- [3] Accept all facts listed in plaintiffs' separate statement, to the extent that there is evidence to support them. (*Ibid.*)
- [4] Disregard any evidence not called to the trial court's attention in the separate statement of one side or the other, except as necessary to provide nondispositive background, color, or continuity.

Turning now to the statement of undisputed material facts that are currently before this court:

<u>Analysis</u>

- C. The TCP causes of action (1st through 4th causes of action for (1) strict liability; (2) negligence; (3) continuing nuisance; and (4) continuing trespass.
- Moving party Shell relies on only two undisputed material facts to defeat these four causes of action:

- The California Department of Public Health (fka (sic) "Department of Health Services") has not yet set a Maximum Contaminant Level "MCL") for 1,2,3-trichloropropane ("TCP").²
- 2. The City's New York Street Well, Well no. 11 and Well no. 41 are not currently used to supply potable drinking water.

Preliminarily, it can be noted that moving party's undisputed material fact no. 2 pertains to two wells only, whereas the City applies these four causes of action of its second amended complaint to many more wells than simply these two. Consequently, there is no way that Shell's undisputed material fact no. 2, even if true and undisputed, can assist in disposing of any of these four causes of action.

Shell impliedly argues that each well is a separate cause of action, but as Shell's own cited authority points out, summary adjudication may be granted as to "separate and distinct wrongful acts," not separate and distinct damaged items. The City's wells are separately-damaged items—not separate wrongful acts. As addressed before, there is an alleged violation of only one primary right here by Shell's wrongful act of including the toxic agent TCP in its agricultural products sold and used in Redlands during the 1960s.

Shell argues that a court may grant summary adjudication as to "one or more claims for damages," which is a materially incomplete quotation of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1).

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² Shell does not contest that the California Department of Public Health currently is in the process of setting an MCL for TCP.

In truth, this is not the case except for *punitive* damages, not relevant here. (DeCastro, West, Chodorow & Burns v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 420-421.) ³

Shell's first undisputed material fact is central to its argument, which is that Shell's TCP that has leached into the City's water wells through the soil have not caused the City any damage because the City can be damaged only if the TCP level in its wells rises above the MCL set by the Department of Public Health. But the DPH has not yet set an MCL for TCP, therefore the City cannot have been damaged by Shell's TCP contaminating its wells. Apparently, no matter how high the TCP level is. For this proposition, Shell relies heavily on the following California appellate authority: *Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256; *In re Groundwater Cases* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659; *City of Watsonville v. State Dept. of Health Services* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 875; and *Paredes v. County of Fresno* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1. These cases do not assist Shell for the following reasons:

Groundwater, Watsonville, and Paredes establish that water users may not hold their water providers to higher standards—i.e., lower MCLs—for contaminants than those set by the California Department of Public Health. They hold that the MCLs established by the DPH afford a "safe harbor" to water providers from suit by their users for such contaminants because the water providers are controlled by the DPH, with whose regulations the water providers must comply. Here, Shell seeks shelter in the City's "safe harbor." But Shell is not regulated by the DPH. Groundwater, Watsonville, and Paredes were lawsuits between water providers controlled by the DPH and their

³ In an earlier motion, co-defendant Dow asserted that this case is controlled by *County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co.* (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, which Dow argued for the proposition that the City had experienced no property damage. This court's ruling rejected that argument because, while the mere presence of lead within paint on a building does not itself constitute a "property damage" to the building, a toxic substance contaminating a water well certainly does. Defendant Shell does not repeat Dow's argument at this motion.

users. There is simply nothing in any of these cases that controls lawsuits between a water provider and a third party that has contaminated its wells.

In Hartwell, supra, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of whether Public Utilities Code section 1759—which prohibits the courts from reviewing decisions of the Public Utilities Commission except by writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court. A private corporation not regulated by the PUC sought to benefit from that section by arguing that the superior courts had no jurisdiction over it involving matters regulated by the PUC, either. But the Supreme Court rejected that argument, quoting the court of appeal below, as follows: "'By no stretch of language or logic does this mean that trial courts may not decide issues between parties not subject to PUC regulation simply because the same or similar issues are pending before the PUC or because the PUC regulates the same subject matter in its supervision over public utilities.' (Fn. omitted.) [¶] We agree." (Hartwell, supra, at p. 280.)

This motion does not raise a jurisdictional question, but the reasoning is analogous: There simply is no language or logic extending the "safe harbor" policy that protects PUC-regulated water providers from lawsuits from its users alleging personal injury due to contaminated water so as to protect private corporations that are not regulated by the PUC from lawsuits by water providers for damage to their property. Neither *Groundwater* nor *Watsonville* nor *Paredes* stands for such a proposition.

In sum, Shell's motion for summary adjudication as to these four causes of action fails since it is entirely based on its claim that the City has experienced no damages to any of its wells from TCP, which factual claim is supported solely by undisputed material fact no. 1. That undisputed material fact is relevant only if Shell is entitled as a matter of law to "safe harbor" treatment vis-á-vis MCLs set by the DPH. Shell's authorities do not establish that legal proposition.

Accordingly, the court denies Shell's motion as to the City's first four causes of action for the above reasons.

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D. <u>The DBCP causes of action</u> (5th through 8th causes of action for (1) strict liability; (2) negligence; (3) continuing nuisance; and (4) continuing trespass.)

Regarding these causes of action, Shell relies on seven undisputed material facts, but at the bottom line the principle is the same. In the case of DBCP, the California Department of Public Health has set an MCL (Shell's undisputed material fact no. 3), and Shell's undisputed material facts concede that the City contends its testing reveals DBCP in ten of its wells (undisputed material fact no. 4) and DBCP at levels exceeding the MCL in two of its wells (undisputed material fact no. 5). But, Shell argues, the City is not currently using those two wells for drinking water (undisputed material fact no. 6)—therefore it has not been damaged.

Shell's argument as to these four DBCP causes of action fails for the same reason that its argument as to the first four TCP causes of action fails: Shell indirectly seeks the "safe harbor" protection that California appellate authority affords to the City from lawsuits by its users for personal injuries due to contaminants. But Shell cites no authority that would extend the DPH's "safe harbor" protection to private corporations not regulated by the Department in lawsuits against those corporations brought by DPH-regulated water providers for property damage.

Shell's point regarding the fact that wells no. 14 and 41 were not currently being used by the City for potable drinking water fails independently, because that does not establish that the City has experienced no property damage to those wells⁴.

Shell's remaining undisputed material fact relates to its implied argument that this court should summarily adjudicate on a well-by-well—i.e., on a damaged-item-by-damaged-item—basis, which the court need not even reach here

⁴ An analogy: If one is using only 250 GB of a 1000 GB hard drive, and a friend temporarily uses some of the remaining space, and in the process the friend permanently destroys 500 GB of the heretofore unused capacity of hard drive, it cannot be said that one has experienced no property damage simply because you weren't yet using the part that was destroyed. The hard drive has been damaged because it has lost capacity, and in this case the City has been damaged because that capacity is no longer available for use.

since adopting the above discussion would preclude summary adjudication in any event.

Accordingly, the court will deny Shell's motion as to the City's last four causes of action for the above reasons.

E. Disposition

Shell's motions for summary adjudication as to each of the City's eight causes of action are denied. The court finds that Shell's motions fail on a point of law in that, contrary to Shell's argument, it is not entitled to the benefit of the "safe harbor" protection afforded by California Department of Public Health Maximum Contaminant Levels to water providers regulated by the Department regarding lawsuits against said water providers by their users. (Distinguishing *In re Groundwater Cases* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659, *City of Watsonville v. State Dept. of Health Services* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 875, and *Paredes v. County of Fresno* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1. See also, by analogy, *Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256, 280.)

Shell's May 22-filed requests for judicial notice of Exhibits F through L are denied for lack of authentication.

The City's July 24-filed requests for judicial notice nos. 1 through 9 are denied for lack of authentication.

Shell's July 31-filed requests for judicial notice nos. 3-5, 8 and 9 are denied for lack of authentication.

Shell's July 31-filed objections to plaintiff City's evidence are overruled as to objections nos. 1, 3 and 5 to the Diggs declaration, as to objections nos. 1, 2 and 4 of the McIntyre declaration, as to objection no. 1 to the Cohen declaration, and—on the basis stated therein, as to objection no. 1 to the City's request for judicial notice. Shell's objections are sustained as to objection no. 1 to the Austin declaration, as to objections nos. 2 and 4 to the Diggs declaration, as to objection no. 3 of the McIntyre declaration, and as to objections 2 through 7 of the City's request for judicial notice.

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4	Dow's objection is overruled and its request for judicial notice is denied. (The
2	court always notices published opinions of California appellate authority.)
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5	Dated this of October 2009
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8	Thursday of the state of the st
9	DONALD R. ALVAREZ
10	Judge of the Superior Court
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY LEXISNEXIS FILE AND SERVE

I, the undersigned, declare that I am, and was at the time of service of the paper(s) herein referred to, over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action. My business a address is 1050 Fulton Avenue, Suite 100, Sacramento, CA 95825-4225.

On October 26, 2009, I served the following documents:

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT SHELL OIL COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION ON THE FIRST THROUGH EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION AND THE JOINDER OF OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION

on all parties on the attached service list by posting a true and correct copy thereof to LexisNexis File and Serve.

I declare under penalty of perjury that true and correct copies of the above document(s) were served via LexisNexis File & Serve on October 26, 2009.

Selle Mercon_ Kathy Herrory

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